Abstract. We initiate the study of Access Control Encryption (ACE), a novel cryptographic primitive that allows fine-grained access control, by giving different rights to different users not only in terms of which messages they are allowed to receive, but also which messages they are allowed to send. Classical examples of security policies for information flow are the well known Bell-Lapadula [BL73] or Biba [Bib75] model: in a nutshell, the Bell-Lapadula model assigns roles to every user in the system (e.g., public, secret and top-secret). A users' role specifies which messages the user is allowed to receive (i.e., the no read-up rule, meaning that users with public clearance should not be able to read messages marked as secret or top-secret) but also which messages the user is allowed to send (i.e., the no writedown rule, meaning that a malicious user with top-secret clearance should not be able to write messages marked as secret or public). To the best of our knowledge, no existing cryptographic primitive allows for even this simple form of access control, since no existing cryptographic primitive enforces any restriction on what kind of messages one should be able to encrypt. Our contributions are:
Introduction
Traditionally, cryptography has been about providing secure communication over insecure channels. We want to protect honest parties from external adversaries: only the party who has the decryption key can access the message. More recently, more complicated situations have been considered, where we do not want to trust everybody with the same information: depending on who you are and which keys you have, you can access different parts of the information sent (this can be done using, e.g., functional encryption [BSW11] ).
However, practitioners who build secure systems in real life are often interested in achieving different and stronger properties: one wants to control the information flow in the system, and this is not just about what you can receive, but also about what you can send. As an example, one may think of the first security policy model ever proposed, the one by Bell and Lapadula [BL73] . Slightly simplified, this model classifies users of a system in a number of levels, from "public" in the bottom to "top-secret" on top. Then two rules are defined: 1) "no read-up" -a user is not allowed to receive data from higher levels and 2) "no write-down" -a user is not allowed to send data to lower levels. The idea is of course to ensure confidentiality: data can flow from the bottom towards the top, but not in the other direction. Clearly, both rules are necessary, in particular we need no write-down, since a party on top-secret level may try to send information she should not, either by mistake or because her machine has been infected by a virus.
In this paper we study the question of whether cryptography can help in enforcing such security policies. A first thing to realize is that this problem cannot be solved without some assumptions about physical, i.e., non-cryptographic security: if the communication lines cannot be controlled, we cannot prevent a malicious user from sending information to the wrong place. We therefore must introduce a party that controls the communication, which we will call the sanitizer San. We assume that all outgoing communication must pass through this party. San can then be instructed to do some specific processing on the messages it gets.
Of course, with this assumption the problem can be solved: San is told what the security policy is and simply blocks all messages that should not be sent according to the policy. This is actually a (simplified) model of how existing systems work, where San is implemented by the operating system and various physical security measures.
However, such a solution is problematic for several reasons: users must securely identify themselves to San so that he can take the correct decisions, this also means that when new users join the system San must be informed about this, directly or indirectly. A side effect of this is that San necessarily knows who sends to whom, and must of course know the security policy. This means that a company cannot outsource the function of San to another party without disclosing information on internal activities of the company.
Therefore, a better version of our basic question is the following: can we use cryptography to simplify the job of San as much as is possible, and also ensure that he learns minimal information?
To make the goal more precise, note that it is clear that San must process each message that is sent i.e., we cannot allow a message violating the policy to pass through unchanged. But we can hope that the processing to be done does not depend on the security policy, and also not on the identities of the sender and therefore of the allowed receivers. This way we get rid of the need for users to identify themselves to San. It is also clear that San must at least learn when a message was sent and its length, but we can hope to ensure he learns nothing more. This way, one can outsource the function of running San to a party that is only trusted to execute correctly.
Our goal in this paper is therefore to come up with a cryptographic notion and a construction that reduces the sanitizer's job to the minimum we just described. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied before in the cryptographic literature, and it is easy to see that existing constructions only solve "half the problem": we can easily control which users you can receive from by selecting the key material we give out (assuming that the sender is honest). This is exactly what attribute based [GPSW06] or functional encryption [BSW11] can do. But any such scheme of course allows a malicious sender to encrypt what he wants for any receiver he wants.
Our Contribution. In this paper we propose a solution based on a new notion called Access Control Encryption (ACE). In a nutshell ACE works as follows: an ACE scheme has a key generation algorithm that produces a set of sender keys, a set of receiver keys and a sanitizer key. An honest sender S encrypts message m under his sender key and sends it for processing by San using the sanitizer key. San does not need to know the security policy, nor who sends a message or where it is going (so a sender does not have to identify himself): San simply executes a specific randomised algorithm on the incoming ciphertext and passes the result on to a broadcast medium, e.g., a disk from where all receivers can read. So, as desired, San only knows when a message was sent and its length.
1 An honest receiver R who is allowed to receive from S is able to recover m using his key and the output from San. On the other hand, consider a corrupt sender S who is not allowed to send to R. ACE ensures that no matter what S sends, what R receives (after being processed by San) looks like a random encryption of a random message. In fact we achieve security against collusions: considering a subset S of senders and a subset R of receivers, if none of these senders are allowed to send to any of the receivers, then S cannot transfer any information to R, even if players in each set work together. We propose two constructions of ACE: one based on standard number theoretic assumptions (DDH, Pailler) which achieves complexity linear in the number of roles, and one based on recent results in cryptographic obfuscation, which achieves complexity polylogarithmic in the number of roles.
Example. A company is working on a top-secret military project for the government. To protect the secrets the company sets up an access policy that determines which employees are allowed to communicate (e.g., a researcher with top-secret clearance should not be allowed to send classified information to the intern, who is making the coffee and only has public clearance). To implement the access policy, the company sets up a special server that sanitizes every message sent on the internal network before publishing it on a bulletin board or broadcasting it. Using ACE this can be done without requiring users to log into the sanitizer. Furthermore, if corrupted parities (either inside or outside the company) want to intercept the communication they will get no information from the sanitizer server, since it does not know the senders identities and the messages sent over the network.
In the following sections, we describe ACE in more detail and take a closer look at our technical contributions.
Access Control Encryption: The Problem it Solves
Senders and Receivers. We have n (types of) senders S 1 , . . . , S n and n (types of) receivers R 1 , . . . , R n .
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There is some predicate P : [n] × [n] → {0, 1}, where P (i, j) = 1 means that S i is allowed to send to R j , while P (i, j) = 0 means that S i is not allowed to send to R j .
Network Model. We assume that senders are connected to all receivers via a public channel i.e., a sender cannot send a message only to a specific receiver and any receiver can see all traffic from all senders (also from those senders they are not allowed to communicate with).
Requirements. Informally we want the following properties 3 1. Correctness: When an honest sender S i sends a message m, all receivers R j with P (i, j) = 1 learn m; 2. No-Read Rule: At the same time all receivers R j with P (i, j) = 0 learn no information about m; 3. No-Write Rule: No (corrupt) sender S i should be able to communicate any information to any (possibly corrupt) receiver
Note that the no-read rule on its own is a simple confidentiality requirement, which can be enforced using standard encryption schemes. On the other hand standard cryptographic tools do not seem to help in satisfying the no-write rule. In particular the no-write rule is very different from the standard authenticity requirement and e.g., signature schemes cannot help here: had we asked for a different property such as "a corrupt sender S i should not be allowed to communicate with an honest receiver R j if P (i, j) = 0" then the problem could be solved by having R j verify the identity of the sender (using a signature scheme) and ignore messages from any sender i with P (i, j) = 0. Instead, we are trying to block communication even between corrupt senders and corrupt receivers.
The problem as currently stated is impossible to solve, since a corrupt sender can broadcast m in the clear to all receivers (the corrupt sender might not care that other receivers also see the message). As mentioned above, we therefore enhance the model by adding a special party, which we call the sanitizer San. The sanitizer receives messages from senders, performs some computation on them, and then forwards them to all receivers. In other words, we allow the public channel to perform some computation before delivering the messages to the receivers. Hence, the output of the sanitizer is visible to all receivers (i.e., the sanitizer cannot give different outputs to different receivers). We therefore add the following requirement to our no-read rule:
2b. The sanitizer should not learn anything about the communication it routes. In particular, the sanitizer should not learn any information about the message m which is being transmitted nor the identity of the sender i;
In Section 2 we formalize properties 2 and 2b as a single one (i.e., no set of corrupt receivers, even colluding with the sanitizer, should be able to break the no-read rule). When considering property 3, we assume the sanitizer not to collude with the corrupt senders and receivers: after all, since the sanitizer controls the communication channel, there is no way of preventing a corrupt sanitizer from forwarding messages from corrupt senders to the corrupt receivers.
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We stress that previous work is not sufficient to achieve property 3: Even encryption schemes with finegrained decryption capabilities (such as predicate-and attribute based-encryption [GPSW06,KSW13]) do not offer security guarantees against colluding senders and receivers.
Technical Overview
Linear ACE. The main idea behind our construction of ACE with linear complexity (described in Section 3) is the following: we start with an ACE for a single identity i.e., where n = 1 and P (1, 1) = 1. First we need to make sure that even a corrupt sender with encryption rights (i.e., i = 1) cannot communicate with a corrupt receiver with no decrypting right (i.e., with a special identity j = 0). To prevent this, since the receiver cannot decrypt the ciphertext, it is enough to use a randomizable public key encryption and let the sanitizer refresh the ciphertext. This ensures that the outgoing ciphertext is distributed exactly as a fresh encryption.
The more challenging task is to ensure that a corrupt sender with no rights (i.e., with a special identity i = 0) cannot transfer any information to a corrupt receiver with decrypting rights (i.e., j = 1), since in this case the receiver knows the decryption key. Thus, we cannot use the security of the underlying encryption scheme. We solve the problem using any encryption scheme which is homomorphic both in the message and in the randomness (such as ElGamal or Pailler). The main idea is to let the encryption key ek as well as the randomizer key rk be some secret value α, and an encryption of a message m being a tuple (c 0 , c 1 ) = (E(ek), E(m)). On input such a tuple the sanitizer picks a random s and outputs c ′ , a fresh encryption of (ek − rk) · s + m (which can be computed thanks to the homomorphic properties of E): note that sanitization does not interfere with honestly generated encryptions (since ek = rk = α), while the sanitized version of a ciphertext produced by anyone who does not know α is indistinguishable from a random encryption of a random value.
We then turn this into a scheme for any predicate P : [n] × [n] → {0, 1} by generating n copies of the single identity ACE scheme. Each receiver j is given the decryption key for one of the schemes, and each sender i is given the encryption key for all instances j such that P (i, j) = 1. The resulting scheme has linear complexity in n, the number of the roles in the system, which makes our scheme impractical for large predicates.
Polylogarithmic ACE. At first it might seem easy to construct an ACE scheme with compact ciphertexts using standard tools (such as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs). In Section 4 we discuss why this is not the case before presenting our construction of an ACE with complexity polylogarithmic in n. To construct the scheme we first introduce the notion of a sanitizable functional encryption (sFE) scheme which is a functional encryption (FE) scheme enhanced with a sanitization algorithm. Informally we require that given any two ciphertexts c 0 , c 1 that decrypt to the same message and a sanitized ciphertext c ′ , no one (even with access to the master secret key), should be able to tell whether c ′ is a sanitized version of c 0 or c 1 .
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We are able to construct such a scheme by modifying the FE based on indistinguishability obfuscation of Garg et al. [GGH + 13]: in their scheme ciphertexts consist of two encryptions and a simulation statisticallysound NIZK proof that they contain the same message. We instantiate their construction with a sanitizable encryption scheme 6 , and we instruct the sanitizer to sanitize the two encryptions, drop the original proof and append a proof of a proof instead (that is, a proof of the fact that the sanitizer saw a proof who would make the original verifier accept). This preserves the functionality of the original FE scheme while making the sanitized ciphertext independent of the randomness used by the sender. We formally define sFE in Section 4.1 and present a construction in Section 4.2.
Finally, armed with such a sFE scheme, we construct a polylog ACE scheme in Section 4.3 in the following way: ciphertexts are generated by encrypting tuples of the form (m, i, y) with y = F eki (m) for a PRF F (where ek i is the the encryption key of the sender S i ), using the sFE scheme. Decryption keys are sFE secret keys for the function that outputs m only if P (i, j) = 1 (and ignores y). The sanitizer key is a sFE secret key which outputs 1 only if y is a valid MAC on m for the identity i (note that this can be checked by a compact circuit by e.g., generating all the keys ek i pseudorandomly using another PRF). This key allows the sanitizer to check if an encryption contains a valid MAC or not, but without learning anything about the message nor the identity. Now the sanitizer drops invalid encryptions (or replaces them with random encryptions of random values for a special, undecryptable identity i = 0) and forwards valid encryptions (after having refreshed them).
Open Questions. We identify two major opens questions: the first one is to construct practically interesting ACE from noisy, post-quantum assumptions such as LWE -the challenge here is that it always seems possible for a malicious sender to encrypt with just enough noise that any further manipulation by the sanitizer makes the decryption fail. This can be addressed using "bootstrapping" techniques, but this is not likely to lead to schemes with efficiency comparable to the ones based on DDH or Pailler described above. The second open question is to design sublinear ACE scheme with practical efficiency even for limited classes of interesting predicates such as e.g., P (i, j) = 1 ⇔ i ≥ j.
Related Work
One of the main challenges in our setting is to prevent corrupt senders to communicate to corrupt receivers using subliminal channels (e.g., by producing the encryptions with maliciously generated randomness). In some sense we are trying to prevent steganography [HLA02] . Recent work on cryptographic firewalls [MS15, DMS15] also deals with this problem, but in the context of preventing malicious software implementations to leak information via steganographic techniques. Raykova et al. [RZB12] presented solutions to the problem of access control on outsourced data, with focus on hiding the access patterns from the cloud (this is not a concern in our application since all receivers receive all ciphertexts) and in preventing malicious writers from updating files they are not allowed to update. However they only guarantee that malicious writers are caught if they do so, while we want to prevent any communication between corrupt senders and receivers. Backes and Pfitzmann introduced the notion of probabilistic non-interference which allows to relate cryptography to the notion of information flow for both transitive [BP03] and intransitive policies [BP04] . Halevi et al. [HKN05] address the problem of enforcing confinement in the T10 OSD protocol, in the presence of a fully trusted manager (which has a role similar to the sanitizer in our model). Fehr and Fischlin [FF15] study the case of sanitizable signatures in the context of an intermediate party that sanitizes messages and signatures send over the channel. The special party learns as little as possible about the messages and signatures. However, they do not prevent corrupt senders from sending information to corrupt receivers. Finally, the problem of hiding policies and credentials in the context of attribute based encryption has been studied by Frikken [FFLW15] . However, they do not consider the case of preventing corrupt sender from communicating with corrupt receivers (e.g. by sending the message unencrypted over the channel).
2 Defining ACE ACE Notation. An access control encryption (ACE) scheme is defined by the following algorithms:
Setup: The Setup algorithm on input the security parameter κ and a policy P : [n] × [n] → {0, 1} outputs a master secret key msk and public parameters pp, which include the message space M and ciphertext spaces C, C ′ .
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Key Generation: The Gen algorithm on input the master secret key msk, an identity i ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1},
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and a type t ∈ {sen, rec, san} outputs a key k. We use the following notation for the three kind of keys in the system: -ek i ← Gen(msk, i, sen) and call it an encryption key for i ∈ [n] -dk j ← Gen(msk, j, rec) and call it a decryption key for j ∈ [n] -ek 0 = dk 0 = pp; -rk ← Gen(msk, n + 1, san) and call it the sanitizer key; Encrypt: The Enc algorithm on input an encryption key ek i and a message m outputs a ciphertext c. Sanitizer: San transforms an incoming ciphertext c ∈ C into a sanitized ciphertext c ′ ∈ C ′ using the sanitizer key rk; Decryption: Dec recovers a message m ′ ∈ M ∪ {⊥} from a ciphertext c ′ ∈ C ′ using a decryption key dk j .
ACE Requirements. We formalize Properties 1-3 from the introduction in the following way:
, and rk ← Gen(msk, n + 1, san), and the probabilities are taken over the random coins of all algorithms.
Definition 2 (No-Read Rule). Consider the following game between a challenger C and a stateful adversary A:
OG(j, t):
We say that A wins the No-Read game if b = b ′ , |m 0 | = |m 1 |, i 0 , i 1 ∈ {0, . . . , n} and one of the following holds:
Payload Privacy: For all queries q to O G with q = (j, rec) it holds that
Sender Anonymity: For all queries q to O G with q = (j, rec) it holds that P (i 0 , j) = P (i 1 , j) and m 0 = m 1 7 We use the convention that all other algorithms take pp as input even if not specified. Formally, one can think of the pp as being part of msk and all other keys ek, dk, sk. 8 To make notation more compact we define two special identities: i = 0 representing a sender or receiver with no rights such that P (0, j) = 0 = P (i, 0) for all i, j ∈ [n]; i = n + 1 to be the sanitizer identity, which cannot receive from anyone but can send to all i.e., P (n + 1, j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [n] and
We say an ACE scheme satisfies the No-Read rule if for all PPT A
Definition 2 captures the requirement that only intended receivers should be able to learn anything about the message (payload privacy) and that no one (even intended receivers) should learn anything about the identity of the sender (sender anonymity). Note that the ciphertext c sent by the challenger to the adversary has not been sanitized and that the adversary is allowed to query for the sanitizer key rk. This implies that even the sanitizer (even with help of any number of senders and unintended receivers) should not learn anything. Note additionally that the adversary is allowed to query for the encryption keys ek i0 , ek i1 corresponding to the challenge identities i 0 , i 1 , which implies that the ability to encrypt to a particular identity does not automatically grant the right to decrypt ciphertexts created with that identity (e.g., a user might be able to write top-secret documents but not to read them). Note that if i b = 0 for some b ∈ {0, 1}, then the definition implies that it is possible to create "good looking" ciphertexts even without having access to any of the senders' keys. This is explicitly used in our solution with linear complexity. Furthermore note that if there exist multiple keys for a single identity (e.g., the output of Gen(msk, i, sen) is randomized), then our definition does not guarantee that the adversary can ask the oracle O G for the encryption key used to generate the challenge ciphertext. The definition can be easily amended to grant the adversary this power but (since in all our constructions ek i is a deterministic function of msk and i) we prefer to present the simpler definition. Finally, the encryption oracle O E models the situation that the adversary is allowed to see encrypted messages under identities for which he does not have the encryption key.
Definition 3 (No-Write Rule). Consider the following game between a challenger C and a stateful adversary A:
Definition 3 captures the property that any set of (corrupt) senders {S i } i∈I cannot transfer any information to any set of (corrupt) receivers {R j } j∈J unless at least one of the senders in I is allowed communication to at least one of the receivers in J (Condition 3)
9 . This is modelled by saying that in the eyes of the receivers, the sanitized version of a ciphertext coming from this set of senders looks like the sanitized version of a fresh encryption of a random value produced by one of these senders (Condition 2). Note that if the adversary does not ask for any encryption key (i.e., I S = ∅), then the only valid choice for i ′ is 0: this implies that (as described for the no-read rule) there must be a way of constructing "good looking" ciphertexts using the public parameters only 10 and this property is used crucially in the construction of our linear scheme. Furthermore, we require that the adversary does not corrupt the sanitizer (Condition 1) which is, as discussed in the introduction, an unavoidable condition. Finally, the encryption oracle O E again models the situation that the adversary is allowed to see encrypted messages under identities for which he do not have the encryption key.
Linear ACE from Standard Assumptions
The roadmap of this section is the following: we construct an ACE scheme for a single identity (i.e., n = 1 and P (1, 1) = 1) from standard number theoretic assumptions, and then we construct an ACE scheme for any predicate P : [n] × [n] → {0, 1} using a repetition scheme. The complexity of the final scheme (in terms of public-key and ciphertext size) is n times the complexity of the single-identity scheme.
ACE for a Single Identity
We propose two constructions of ACE for a single identity (or 1-ACE for short). The first is based on the DDH assumption and is presented in this section, while the second is based on the security of Pailler's cryptosystem and is deferred to Appendix C.1. Both schemes share the same basic idea: the encryption key ek is some secret value α, and an encryption of a message m is a pair of encryptions (c 0 , c 1 ) = (E(α), E(m)). The sanitizer key is also the value α, and a sanitized ciphertext is computed as c
which (thanks to the homomorphic properties of both ElGamal and Pailler) is an encryption of a uniformly random value unless c 0 is an encryption of α, in which case it is an encryption of the original message m. The decryption key is simply the decryption key for the original encryption scheme, which allows to retrieve m from c ′ . Note that even knowing the decryption key is not enough to construct ciphertexts which "resist" the sanitization, since the receiver never learns the value α.
1-ACE from DDH: Our first instantiation is based on the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [Gam85] . The construction looks similar to other double-strand versions of ElGamal encryption which have been used before in the literature to achieve different goals (e.g., by Golle et al. [GJJS04] in the context of universal re-encryption and by Prabhakaran and Rosulek [PR07] in the context of rerandomizable CCA security). Construction 1. Let EGACE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) be a 1-ACE scheme defined by the following algorithms:
Setup: Let (G, q, g) be the description of a cyclic group of prime order q generated by g. Let (α, x) ← Z q ×Z q be uniform random elements, and compute h = g x . Output the public parameter pp = (G, q, g, h) and the master secret key msk = (α, x). The message space is M = G and the ciphertext spaces are C = G 4 and C ′ = G × G. Key Generation: Given the master secret key msk, the encryption, decryption and sanitizer key are computed as follows:
-rk = −α; Encryption: Given the message m and an encryption key ek, sample random r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q and output:
(and encryptions for the identity 0 are random tuples from G 4 ). Sanitize: Given a ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ C and a sanitizer key rk, sample uniform random s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z q and output:
′ and a decryption key dk, output: 
Thus, the sanitization of a valid ciphertext produces a new valid ciphertext under the same identity and of the same message.
No-Read Rule: There are three possible cases, depending on which identities the adversary queries during the game: the case (i 0 , i 1 ) = (0, 0) is trivial as both Enc(ek 0 , m b ) for b ∈ {0, 1} are random ciphertexts; the case (i 0 , i 1 ) = (1, 1) is trivial if the adversary asks for the decryption key dk, since in this case it must be that m 0 = m 1 . The case where the adversary does not ask for the decryption key and i 0 = i 1 implies the case where the adversary does not ask for the decryption key and (i 0 , i 1 ) = (1, 1) using standard hybrid arguments (i.e., if Enc(ek, m) is indistinguishable from a random ciphertext c ← C for all m, then Enc(ek, m 0 ) is indistinguishable from Enc(ek, m 1 ) for all m 0 , m 1 ). So we are only left to prove that honest encryptions are indistinguishable from a random element in C = G 4 , which follows in a straightforward way from the DDH assumption. In particular, since (g, h, g r2 , h r2 ) is indistinguishable from (g, h, g r2 , h r3 ) for random r 2 , r 3 we can replace c 3 with a uniformly random element (independent of m). Notice that neither α (the encryption and sanitizer key) nor encryptions from oracle O E will help the adversary distinguish. Thus, we can conclude that the adversary's advantage is negligible, since he cannot distinguish in all three cases.
No-Write Rule:
We only need to consider two cases, depending on which keys the adversary asks for before producing the challenge ciphertext c and identity i ′ : 1) the adversary asks for ek before issuing his challenge (c, i ′ ) with i ′ ∈ {0, 1} (and receives no more keys during the distinguishing phase) and 2) the adversary asks for dk before issuing his challenge (c, 0) and then asks for ek during the distinguishing phase. Case 1) follows directly from the DDH assumption: without access to the decryption key the output of the sanitizer is indistinguishable from a random ciphertext thanks to the choice of the random s 2 , in particular since
) with uniformly random elements in G. Case 2) instead has to hold unconditionally, since the adversary has the decryption key. We argue that the distribution of San(rk, (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 )) is independent of its input. In particular, given any (adversarially chosen) (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ G 4 we can write:
Which is distributed exactly as a uniformly random ciphertext (g γ0 , g γ1 ) with (γ 0 , γ 1 ) ∈ Z q × Z q since for all (γ 0 , γ 1 ) there exists (s 0 , s 1 ) such that:
This is guaranteed unless the two equations are linearly dependent i.e., unless α = (δ 1 − xδ 0 ) which happens only with negligible probability thanks to the principle of deferred decisions. The adversary is allowed to see sanitized ciphertext from the encryption oracle. However, this does not help him distinguish, since the output of the San algorithm is distributed exactly as a uniform ciphertext. Thus, we can conclude that the adversary's advantage is negligible, since he cannot distinguish in both cases.
Construction of an ACE Scheme for Multiple Identities
In this section we present a construction of an ACE scheme for multiple identities, which is based on the 1-ACE scheme in a black-box manner. In a nutshell, the idea is the following: we run n copies of the 1-ACE scheme and we give to each receiver j the decryption key dk j for the j-th copy of the scheme. An encryption key for identity i is given by the set of encryption keys ek j of the 1-ACE scheme such that P (i, j) = 1. To encrypt, a sender encrypts the same message m under all its encryption keys ek j and puts random ciphertexts in the positions for which he does not know an encryption key. The sanitizer key contains all the sanitizer keys for the 1-ACE scheme: this allows the sanitizer to sanitize each component independently, in such a way that for all the positions for which the sender knows the encryption key, the message "survives" the sanitization, whereas in the other positions the output is uniformly random.
Example. We conclude this informal introduction of our repetition scheme by giving a concrete example of an ACE scheme for the Bell-LaPadula access control policy with three levels of access: Level 1: top-secret, level 2: secret, level 3: public. The predicate of this access control is defined as P (i, j) = 1 ⇔ i ≥ j. This predicate ensures the property of no write down and no read up as discussed in the introduction. Table 1 shows the structure of the keys and the ciphertext for the different levels of access. Construction 2. Let 1ACE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) be a 1-ACE scheme. Then we can construct an ACE scheme ACE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) defined by the following algorithms:
Setup: Let n be the number of senders/receivers specified by the policy P . Then run n copies of the 1ACE setup algorithm (pp
For each of the 1ACE master secret keys run the 1ACE key generation algorithm on each of the three modes. For i ∈ [n] do the following
Output the public parameter and the master secret key
Key Generation: On input an identity i ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1}, a mode {sen, rec, san} and the master secret key msk, output a key depending on the mode
On input an encryption key ek i and a message m encrypt the message under each of the 1ACE encryption keys in ek i and sample uniform random ciphertext for each public key not in the encryption key. Thus, for j = 1, . . . , n do the following
Sanitizer: On input a ciphertext c and a sanitizer key rk, sanitize each of the n 1ACE ciphertexts as follows
Decryption: On input a ciphertext c and a decryption key dk i decrypt the i'th 1ACE ciphertext
We can prove that the scheme presented above satisfies correctness as well as the no-read and the no-write rule, by reducing the properties of the repetition scheme to properties of the scheme with a single identity using hybrid arguments. The formal proofs are deferred to Appendix C.2.
Polylogarithmic ACE from iO
In this section, we present our construction of ACE with polylogarithmic complexity in the number of roles n.
At first it might seem that it is easy to construct an ACE scheme with short ciphertexts by using NIZK and re-randomizable encryption: the sender would send to the sanitizer a ciphertext and a NIZK proving that the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption of some message using a public key that the sender is allowed to send to (for instance, each sender could have a signature on their identity to be able to prove this statement). Now the sanitizer drops the NIZK and passes on the re-randomized ciphertext. However, the problem is that the sanitizer would need to know the public key of the intended receiver to be able to re-randomize (and we do not want to reveal who the receiver is).
11 There exists some encoding function that takes a message m from the message space of the ACE scheme and encodes it into a message of each of the 1-ACE message spaces. The ciphertext spaces of the ACE scheme are the crossproduct of all the 1-ACE ciphertext spaces, thus
As described in the introduction, we build our ACE scheme on top of a FE scheme which is sanitizable, which roughly means that given a ciphertext it is possible to produce a new encryption of the same message which is independent of the randomness used in the original encryption (this is a relaxation of the well-known re-randomizability property, in the sense that we do not require sanitized ciphertexts to look indistinguishable from fresh encryptions e.g., they can be syntactically different). We construct such an FE scheme by modifying the FE scheme of Garg et al. [GGH + 13], and therefore our construction relies on the assumption that indistinguishability obfuscation exists. We define and construct sFE in Section 4.1 and then construct ACE based on sFE (and a regular PRF) in Section 4.3.
Sanitizable Functional Encryption Scheme -Definition
A sanitizable functional encryption (sFE) scheme is defined by the following algorithms:
Setup: The Setup algorithm on input the security parameter κ outputs a master secret key msk and public parameters pp, which include the message space M and ciphertext spaces C, C ′ . Key Generation: The Gen algorithm on input the master secret key msk and a function f , outputs a corresponding secret key SK f . Encrypt: The Enc algorithm on input the public parameters pp and a message m, outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C Sanitizer: The San algorithm on input the public parameters pp and a ciphertext c ∈ C, transforms the incoming ciphertext into a sanitized ciphertext c ′ ∈ C ′ Decryption: The Dec algorithm on input a secret key SK f and a sanitized ciphertext c ′ ∈ C ′ that encrypts message m, outputs f (m).
For the sake of exposition we also define a master decryption algorithm that on input c ← Enc(pp, m), returns m ← MDec(msk, c).
13 We formally define correctness and IND-CPA security for an sFE scheme (which are essentially the same as for regular FE), and then we define the new sanitizable property which, as described above, is a relaxed notion of the re-randomization property.
Definition 4 (Correctness for sFE). Given a function family F . For all f ∈ F and all messages m ∈ M:
where (pp, msk) ← Setup(1 κ ) and the probabilities are taken over the random coins of all algorithms.
Definition 5 (IND-CPA Security for sFE). Consider the following game between a challenger C and a stateful adversary A:
IND-CPA Security Game Definition Oracle Definition
We say that A wins the IND-CPA game if b = b ′ , |m 0 | = |m 1 |, and that f i (m 0 ) = f i (m 1 ) for all oracle queries f i . We say a sFE scheme satisfies the IND-CPA security property if for all PPT A
Definition 6 (Sanitization for sFE). Consider the following game between a challenger C and a stateful adversary A:
We say that A wins the sanitizer game if b = b ′ . We say a sFE scheme is sanitizable if for all PPT A
Note that in Definition 6 the adversary has access to the master secret key.
Sanitizable Functional Encryption Scheme -Construction
We now present a construction of a sFE scheme based on iO. The construction is based on the functional encryption construction by Garg et. al [GGH + 13]. In their scheme a ciphertext contains two encryptions of the same message and a NIZK of this statement, thus an adversary can leak information via the randomness in the encryptions or the randomness in the NIZK. In a nutshell we make their construct sanitizable by:
1. Replacing the PKE scheme with a sanitizable PKE (as formalized in Definition 7). 2. Letting the sanitizer drop the original NIZK, and append a proof of a proof instead (i.e., a proof that the sanitizer knows a proof that would make the original verifier accept). Thanks to the ZK property the new NIZK does not contain any information about the randomness used to generate the original NIZK. 3. Changing the decryption keys (obfuscated programs) to check the new proof instead.
Building Blocks. We formalize here the definition of sanitization for a PKE scheme. Any re-randomizable scheme (such as Paillier and ElGamal) satisfies perfect PKE sanitization, but it might be possible that more schemes fit the definition as well.
Definition 7 (Perfect PKE Sanitization). Let M be the message space and R be the space from which the randomness for the encryption and sanitization is taken. Then for every message m ∈ M and for all r, s, r ′ ∈ R there exists s ′ ∈ R such that San(pk, Enc(pk, m; r); s) = San(pk, Enc(pk, m; r ′ ); s ′ ) Our constructions also uses (by now standard) tools such as pseudo-random functions (PRF), indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and statistical simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge (SSS-NIZK), which are defined for completeness in Appendix A.
Constructing sFE. We are now ready to present our construction of sFE.
Construction 3. Let sPKE = (Setup, Enc, San, Dec) be a perfect sanitizable public key encryption scheme. Let NIZK = (Setup, Prove, Verify) be a statistical simulation-sound NIZK. Let iO be an indistinguishability obfuscator. We construct a sanitizable functional encryption scheme sFE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) as follows:
Key Generation: On input the master secret key msk and a function f output the secret key SK f = iO(P ) as the obfuscation of the following program Encrypt: On input the public parameters pp and a message m compute two PKE encryptions of the message c 1 ← sPKE.Enc(pk 1 , m; r 1 ) c 2 ← sPKE.Enc(pk 2 , m; r 2 ) with randomness (r 1 , r 2 ). Then create a proof π E that (x E , w E ) ∈ R E with x E = (c 1 , c 2 ) and witness w E = (m, r 1 , r 2 ) π E ← NIZK.Prove(crs E , x E , w E ; t E ) using randomness t E . Output the triple c = (c 1 , c 2 , π E ) as the ciphertext. Sanitizer: On input the public parameter pp and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , π E ) ∈ C compute the following 1. If NIZK.Verify(crs E , x E , π E ) = 1 then c
Output c ′ ← sFE.San(pp, sFE.Enc(pp, ⊥)) with randomness (s 1 , s 2 ) and t S in the PKE and NIZK respectively. The generated NIZK is a proof that (x S , w S ) ∈ R S with x S = (c Lemma 2. Construction 3 is a correct functional encryption scheme.
Proof. Correctness follows from the correctness of the iO, PKE, and SSS-NIZK schemes, and from inspection of the algorithms.
Lemma 3. For any adversary A that breaks the IND-CPA security property of Construction 3, there exists an adversary B for the computational zero-knowledge property of the NIZK scheme, an adversary C for the IND-CPA security of the PKE scheme, and an adversary D for iO such that the advantage of adversary A is
where q is the number of secret key queries adversary A makes during the game, and p sss is the negligible soundness error of the SSS-NIZK scheme.
Proof. Proof. This lemma is proven via a series of indistinguishable hybrid games between the challenger and the adversary. For the proof to go through we notice that the challenger needs to simulate the NIZK proof. At a first look it might seem that the reduction needs to guess the entire ciphertext before setting up the system parameter, but in fact we show that it is enough to guess the message beforehand! Thus, we can use a complexity leveraging technique to get the above advantage. See Appendix D.2 for the full proof.
Polylog ACE scheme
In this section, we present a construction of an ACE scheme for multiple identities based on sanitizable functional encryption. The idea of the construction is the following: an encryption of a message m is a sFE encryption of the message together with the senders identity i and a MAC of the message based on the identity. Crucially, the encryption keys for all identities are generated in a pseudorandom way from a master key, thus it is possible to check MACs for all identities using a compact circuit. The sanitizer key is a sFE secret key for a special function that checks that the MAC is correct for the claimed identity. Then the sanitization consists of sanitizing the sFE ciphertext, and then using the sanitizer key to check the MAC. The decryption key for identity j is a sFE secret key for a function that checks that identity i in the ciphertext and identity j are allowed to communicate (and ignores the MAC). The function then outputs the message iff the check goes through.
Construction 4. Let sFE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) be a sanitizable functional encryption scheme. Let F 1 , F 2 be pseudorandom functions. Then we can construct an ACE scheme ACE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, San, Dec) defined by the following algorithms:
Setup: Let K ← {0, 1} κ be a key for the pseudorandom function F 1 . Run (pp sFE , msk sFE ) ← sFE.Setup(1 κ ). Output the public parameter pp = pp sFE and the master secret key msk = (msk sFE , K) Key Generation: Given the master secret key msk and an identity i, the encryption, decryption and sanitizer key are computed as follows: 
Lemma 5. Construction 4 is a correct ACE scheme Proof. Let P (i, j) = 1 for some i, j. Let c ′ be a honest sanitization of a honest generated encryption of message m under identity i:
Given the decryption key dk j = SK j ← sFE.Gen(msk, f j ). Then the correctness property of the sFE scheme gives Proof. Assume that any adversary wins the IND-CPA security game of the sanitizable functional encryption (sFE) scheme with advantage at most ǫ. Assume for contradiction that there is an adversary A that wins the ACE no-read game with advantage greater than ǫ, then we can construct an adversary B that wins the IND-CPA security game for the sFE scheme with advantage greater than ǫ. B starts by generating K ← {0, 1} κ for some pseudorandom function F 1 . Then B receives pp sFE from the challenger and forwards it as the ACE public parameter to the adversary A. Adversary A then performs some oracle queries to O G and O E to which B replies as follows:
-B receives (j, sen), then he sends ek j ← F 1 (K, j) to A. -B receives (j, rec), then he makes an oracle query O(f j ) to the challenger and gets back SK j . B sends dk j = SK j to A. -B receives (j, san), then he makes an oracle query O(f rk ) to the challenger and gets back SK rk . B sends rk = SK rk to A. to the challenger, where m sFE l = (m l , i l , F 2 (ek i l , m l )) for l ∈ {0, 1}. Then the sFE challenger sends a ciphertext c ′ , which B forwards to A as the ACE ciphertext. This is followed by a new round of oracle queries.
If the sFE challenger is in case b = 0, then c ′ is generated as an sFE encryption of message m Theorem 2. For any adversary A that breaks the No-Write Rule of Construction 4, there exists an adversary B for the PRF security, an adversary C for the sanitizer property of the sFE scheme, and an adversary D for the IND-CPA security of the sFE scheme, such that the advantage of A is
Proof. This theorem is proven by presenting a series of hybrid games.
Hybrid 0. The no-write game for b = 1 Hybrid 1. As Hybrid 0, except that when the challenger receives a oracle request (i, sen) he saves the identity: I S = I S ∪ i, and the encryption key ek i ← F 1 (K, i). When the challenger receives the challenge (c, i ′ ) he uses the sFE master decryption to get (m * , i * , t * ) ← sFE.MDec(msk sFE , c)
If i * / ∈ I S , then the challenger generates ek i * honestly. Next, he checks that t * = F 2 (ek i * , m * ). If the check goes through he computes the challenge response as c * ← sFE.San(pp sFE , c), otherwise c * ← San(rk, Enc(ek 0 , ⊥)).
Hybrid 2. As Hybrid 1, except that the encryption keys are chosen uniformly at random: ek i ← $ {0, 1} κ for all i, (note that ek i * is also chosen at random).
Hybrid 3. As Hybrid 2, except that after receiving and master decrypting the challenge, the challenger check whether i * ∈ I S . If this is the case the challenger checks the MAC t * as above, otherwise he compute the response as c * ← San(rk, Enc(ek 0 , ⊥)).
Hybrid 4. As Hybrid 3, except that if the checks i * ∈ I S and t * = F 2 (ek i * , m * ) go through, then the challenger computes the response as
Hybrid 5. As Hybrid 4, except that the challenge response is computed as
where r ← $ M and rk ← Gen(msk, n + 1, san).
Hybrid 6. As Hybrid 5, except that the encryption keys are generated honestly:
Observe, this is the no-write game for b = 0. Now we show that each sequential pair of the hybrids are indistinguishable.
Claim 1. Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 are identical.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of the sanitization and sanitizer key rk.
Claim 2. For any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2, there exists an adversary B for the security of PRF F 1 such that the advantage of A is adv
Proof. Assume that any adversary can break the PRF security with advantage ǫ, and assume for contradiction that we can distinguish the hybrids with advantage greater than ǫ. Then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the PRF security with advantage greater than ǫ. B starts by creating the public parameters honestly and sends it to the adversary. All the adversary oracle queries are answered as follows: whenever B receives (i, sen) from the adversary, he sends i to the PRF challenger, receives back y i , set ek i := y i , and sends ek i to the adversary. When B receives the challenge (i, m) he ask the challenger for the encryption key (as before), and encrypts m. The rest of adversary's queries are answered honestly by using the algorithms of the construction. When B receives (c, i ′ ) from the adversary, he master decrypts the ciphertext to get (m * , i * , t * ). If i * / ∈ I S , then B creates ek i * by sending i * to the challenger. B concludes the game by forwarding the adversary's guess b ′ to the challenger. Observe that the if y i ← F 1 (K, i) then we are in Hybrid 1, and if y i is uniform random, then we are in Hybrid 2. Thus, if adversary A can distinguish between the hybrids, then B can break the constraint PRF property. Proof. Assume that any adversary can break the PRF security with advantage ǫ − 2 −κ , and assume for contradiction that we can distinguish the hybrids with advantage greater than ǫ. Then we can construct an adversary B ′ that breaks the PRF security with advantage greater than ǫ − 2 −κ . B ′ starts by creating the public parameters and sending them to the adversary. The adversary's oracle queries are answered honestly by using the algorithms of the construction. When C receives the challenge (c, i ′ ) he master decrypts the ciphertext to get (m * , i * , t * ). Then he sends m * to the challenger and receives back t ′ . If t ′ = t * then B ′ guess that the challenger is using the pseudorandom function F 2 , otherwise B ′ guess that the challenger is using a random function.
We evaluate now the advantage of B ′ in the PRF game: Observe, if t ′ is generated using F 2 , then B ′ outputs "PRF" with probability exactly ǫ. In the case when t ′ is generated using a random function, then it does not matter how t * was created, and the probability that t ′ = t * is 2 −κ . Thus, the advantage of adversary B ′ is greater than ǫ − 2 κ .
Claim 4. For any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4, there exists an adversary C for the sanitizer property of the sFE scheme such that the advantage of A is adv A ≤ adv sFE,C .
Proof. Assume that any adversary wins the sanitizer game for the sFE scheme with advantage ǫ, and assume for contradiction that we can distinguish the hybrids with advantage greater than ǫ. Then we can construct an adversary C that wins the sanitizer game with advantage greater than ǫ. C starts by receiving the sFE system parameters from the challenger, and he forwards the public parameters as the ACE public parameters to the adversary. The adversary's oracle queries are answered honestly by using the algorithms of the construction, since C receives the sFE master secret key from the challenger. When C receives the challenge (c, Proof. Assume that any adversary wins the IND-CPA game for the sFE scheme with advantage ǫ, and assume for contradiction that we can distinguish the hybrids with advantage greater than ǫ. Then we can construct an adversary D that wins the IND-CPA game with advantage greater than ǫ. D start by receiving the sFE public parameters from the challenger and forwards it to the challenger. The adversary's oracle queries are answered by sending secret key queries to the challenger, and otherwise using the algorithms of the construction (see the proof of Theorem 1 for more details). When The proof follow the same structure as the proof for Claim 2.
From these claims we can conclude that for any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 6, there exists an adversary B for the PRF security, an adversary C for the sanitizer property of the sFE scheme, and an adversary D for the IND-CPA security of the sFE scheme, such that the advantage of A is
with O 0 a uniform random function and O 1 = F K .
A.2 Statistical Simulation-Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
The content of this subsection is taken almost verbatim from [GGH + 13]. Let L be a language and R a relation such that x ∈ L if and only if there exists a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R. A non-interactive proof system [BFM88] for a relation R is defined by the following PPT algorithms Setup: The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs common reference string crs. Prove: The Prove algorithm takes as input the common reference string crs, a statement x, and a witness w, and outputs a proof π. Verify: The Verify algorithm takes as input the common reference string crs, a statement x, and a proof π.
It outputs 1 if it accepts the proof, and 0 otherwise.
The non-interactive proof system must be complete, meaning that if R(x, w) = 1 and crs ← Setup(1 κ ) then Verify(crs, x, Prove(crs, x, w)) = 1 Furthermore, the proof system must be statistical sound, meaning that no (unbounded) adversary can convince a honest verifier of a false statement. Moreover, we define the following additional properties of a non-interactive proof system.
Definition 9 (Computational Zero-Knowledge). A non-interactive proof NIZK = (Setup, Prove, Verify) is computational zero-knowledge if there exists a polynomial time simulator Sim = (Sim 1 , Sim 2 ) such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have for all x ∈ L that
where crs is the common reference string, x is the statement, w is the witness, π is the proof, and τ is the trapdoor. Thus, the definition states that the proof do not reveal any information about the witness to any bounded adversary. In the definition this is formalized by the existence of two simulators, where Sim 1 returns a simulated common reference string together with a trapdoor that enables Sim 2 to simulate proofs without access to the witness.
Definition 10 (Statistical Simulation-Soundness). A non-interactive proof NIZK = (Setup, Prove, Verify) is statistical simulation-sound (SSS) if for all statements x and all (unbounded) adversaries A we have that
where p sss = negl(κ) is negligible in the security parameter.
Thus, the definition states that it is not possible to convince a honest verifier of a false statement even if the adversary is given a simulated proof.
Remark 1. If a proof system is statistical simulation-sound then it is also statistical sound. Thus, we can upper bound the negligible probability of statistical soundness by the negligible probability of the statistical simulation-soundness.
A.3 Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We use an indistinguishability obfuscator like the one proposed in [GGH + 13] such thatC ← iO(C) which takes any polynomial size circuit C and outputs an obfuscated versionC that satisfies the following property.
Definition 11 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation). We say iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class C if for all C 0 , C 1 ∈ C such that ∀x : C 0 (x) = C 1 (x) and |C 0 | = |C 1 | it holds that:
B Equivalent Definition of the No-Write Rule
In this section we provide an alternative definition of the No-Write rule and we prove that this is equivalent to the No-Write rule of Definition 3 (Section 2). The alternative definition is used in the proof of Theorem 4. In Definition 3 the challenger chooses, encrypts and sanitizes a random message if b = 0. In the following definition, we will let the adversary choose the message to be encrypted and sanitized in case b = 0. Thus, we replace the randomly chosen message with an adversarial chosen message.
We say an ACE scheme satisfies the No-Write rule if for all PPT A Proof. The lemma is proven by splitting the bi-implication in two cases:
Def. 12 implies Def. 3. Assume that ACE satisfies the alternative no-write rule, and assume for contradiction that there is an adversary A that wins the ACE no-write game (from Def. 3), then we can construct an adversary B that wins the alternative ACE no-write game. Adversary B receives the public parameters from the challenger (from Def. 12) and forwards them to the adversary A. Then A performs some oracle queries, which adversary B forwards to the challenger. After the oracle queries B receives the challenge (c, i ′ ) from adversary A. Next, B picks a message r ← M and sends (c, i ′ , r) to the challenger. The challenger respond with a sanitized ciphertext c ′ , where c ′ = San(rk, Enc(ek i ′ , r)) if b = 0, and c ′ = San(rk, c) if b = 1. Adversary B forward c ′ to A. This is followed by a new round of oracle queries. Note that c ′ corresponds to the challenge of the no-write game of Def. 3. Thus, we can conclude that if A wins the ACE no-write game (from Def. 3), then B wins the alternative ACE no-write game (from Def. 12).
No-Read Rule and Def. 3 implies Def. 12. This is proven by presenting a series of hybrid games.
Hybrid 0. The alternative no-write game (Def. 12) for b = 0. Hybrid 1. As Hybrid 0, except the challenger ignores the message m send by the adversary and draws its own message r to encrypt. Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an adversary A that can distinguish between the hybrids, then we can construct an adversary B that wins the no-read game from Def. 2.
Adversary B forwards the public parameter from the challenger (of the no-read game) to adversary A, and forwards the oracle queries made by A to the challenger. Note that A plays the alternative no-write game, where the allowed oracle queries are a strict subset of the allowed oracle queries in the no-read game. Claim 2. Assume that the ACE scheme ACE satisfies the no-write rule from Def. 3, then Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are indistinguishable.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an adversary A that can distinguish between the hybrids, then we can construct an adversary B that wins the no-write game (from Def. 3).
Adversary B forwards the public parameter from the challenger (from Def. 3) to adversary A, and forwards the oracle queries made by A to the challenger. Next, B receives the challenge (c, i ′ , m) from adversary A and forward (c, i ′ ) to the challenger. The challenger draws a random bit b * and responds with c ′ = San(rk, Enc(ek i ′ , r)) for random r ← M if b * = 0, and c ′ = San(rk, c) if b * = 1. Adversary B forwards c ′ to A, which is followed by a new round of oracle queries. Note, if b * = 0 then we are in hybrid 1, and if b * = 1 then we are in hybrid 2, which means that if adversary A can distinguish between the hybrids, then adversary B breaks the no-read rule. Thus, Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are indistinguishable.
Claim 3. Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 are identical.
Proof. In both hybrids the adversary sends the challenge (c, i ′ , m) and the challenger will in both cases respond with c ′ = San(rk, c).
Thus, we can conclude that the alternative definition of the no-write rule presented in Def. 12 is equivalent to the no-write rule presented in Def. 3 in Section 2.
C Linear ACE No-Write Rule: As in Lemma 1 there are only two cases, depending on which keys the adversary asks for before producing the challenge ciphertext c and identity i ′ : 1) the adversary asks for ek before issuing his challenge (c, i ′ ) with i ′ ∈ {0, 1} (and receives no more keys during the distinguishing phase) and 2) the adversary asks for dk before issuing his challenge (c, 0) and then asks for ek during the distinguishing phase. Case 1) follows directly from the security of Pailler cryptosystem: without access to the decryption key the output of the sanitizer is indistinguishable from a random ciphertext thanks to the choice of the random s. In case 2) instead the adversary has the decryption key, and we therefore need to argue that the distribution of San(rk, (c 0 , c 1 )) is independent of its input unconditionally. Given any (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C we can write:
Which is distributed exactly as a uniformly random ciphertext (1 + γN )u N with (γ, u) ∈ Z N × Z * N since for all (γ, u) there exists (β, s) such that
Which is guaranteed unless δ 0 = α which happens only with negligible probability thanks to the principle of deferred decisions.
C.2 The Repetition Scheme -Proofs
Lemma 8. Assume that 1ACE is a correct 1-ACE scheme. Then the ACE scheme ACE from Construction 2 enjoys correctness.
Proof. Given any i, j ∈ [n] such that P (i, j) = 1. Let c = c . Observe, given the decryption key dk j = dk 1ACE j , the decryption algorithm ACE.Dec decrypts the j'th 1ACE ciphertext. This means that
The last inequality comes from the correctness of the 1-ACE scheme. Thus, we can conclude that ACE enjoys correctness.
Theorem 3. Assume that 1ACE is a 1-ACE scheme that satisfies the No-Read Rule, and let ACE be the ACE scheme from Construction 2 using 1ACE as the underlying 1-ACE scheme. Then ACE satisfies the No-Read Rule.
Proof. Let Q G be the set of all queries q = (j, t) that the adversary issues to the oracle O G , and let J be the set of all j ∈ [n] such that q = (j, rec) ∈ Q G .
The no-read rule is shown by presenting a series of hybrid games such that no adversary can distinguish between two successive hybrid games with non-negligible probability. In the hybrid games we replace the encryption algorithm with the algorithm: Enc * k (ek i0 , ek i1 , m 0 , m 1 ), which starts by encrypting the two messages m 0 and m 1 under the keys ek i0 and ek i1 to get
Next, the algorithm outputs the following ciphertext (c Payload Privacy. The conditions for the payload privacy property states that for all j ∈ J it holds that P (i 0 , j) = P (i 1 , j) = 0. This means that for all j ∈ J we have that ek
Game 0 ≈ Hybrid 0. In Game 0 the ciphertext is generated by running c ← Enc(ek i0 , m 0 ), while in Hybrid 0 the ciphertext is generated by running
From the description of the algorithm Enc * 0 we can conclude that c ′ is an encryption of m 0 generated by the Enc algorithm using key ek i0 . Thus, the two ciphertexts are identically distributed, which means that Game 0 and Hybrid 0 are identical and therefore indistinguishable to any adversary.
Hybrid k − 1 ≈ Hybrid k. The only difference between the two hybrids is the following: in Hybrid k − 1 the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from Enc(ek i0 , m 0 ), while in Hybrid k the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from Enc(ek i1 , m 1 ).
Observe that in Enc(ek is , m s ) for s ∈ {0, 1} the k'th ciphertext is a 1-ACE encryption of message m s under key ek
∈ ek is , otherwise the ciphertext is taken uniformly random from the 1-ACE ciphertext space C 1ACE k . Thus, we look at four cases
Notice, from the condition of the the payload privacy we have that the adversary is only allowed to ask for the decryption key dk k if ek 1ACE k / ∈ ek is for s ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, if the adversary gets dk k , then we are in Case 1.
In Case 1 the two ciphertexts are clearly indistinguishable, since they are chosen uniformly random from the same ciphertext space.
In Case 2 and 3, the adversary does not have the decryption key dk k . If the adversary A is able to distinguish between Hybrid k − 1 and Hybrid k, then we can construct a new adversary B that breaks the no-read rule of the 1-ACE scheme. Intuitively this is done as follow: when B receives the challenge from adversary A he forwards the messages together with identities 1 and 0, and receives back a 1-ACE ciphertext c ′ from the 1-ACE challenger. Then B creates the challenge ciphertext as in Hybrid k, replaces the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext by c ′ , and sends the ciphertext to the adversary. B will answer adversary A's queries as follows -A queries (i, sen) where P (i, k) = 1, then B queries the challenger for encryption key ek 1ACE k , and construct the rest of the encryption key ek i honestly.
-A queries (n + 1, san), then B queries the challenger for the sanitizer key rk , and construct the rest of the response honestly. -For all other queries B will answer using the algorithms of the scheme.
Notice, A will never query (k, rec) since then we would not be in case 2 or 3. Thus, B never has to query the challenger for dk 1ACE k . If A wins the no-read game with non-negligible probability, then so does adversary B. This contradicts our assumption that the 1-ACE scheme satisfies the no-read rule. Thus, adversary A cannot distinguish between the two hybrids.
In Case 4, the adversary does not have the decryption key dk k . To argue that the two ciphertexts are indistinguishable, we use an intermediate step. Following the same arguments as above, we argue that c 0 k is indistinguishable from a random ciphertext c * , and then we argue that c 1 k is indistinguishable from c * . Thus, the two ciphertexts are indistinguishable.
Hybrid n ≈ Game 1. In Game 1 the ciphertext is generated by running c ← Enc(ek i1 , m 1 ), while in Hybrid n the ciphertext is generated by running
From the description of the algorithm Enc * n we can conclude that c ′ is actually an encryption of m 1 generated by the Enc algorithm using key ek i1 . Thus, the two ciphertexts are identically distributed, which means that Game 1 and Hybrid n are identical and therefore indistinguishable to any adversary.
Sender Anonymity. The conditions for the sender anonymity property states that for all j ∈ J it holds that P (i 0 , j) = P (i 1 , j) and m 0 = m 1 . This means that for all j ∈ J we have that ek 1ACE j is either in both encryption keys ek is for s ∈ {0, 1}, or not in any of the two.
Game 0 ≈ Hybrid 0. The same arguments as in the payload privacy case.
Hybrid k − 1 ≈ Hybrid k. The only difference between the two hybrids is the following: in Hybrid k − 1 the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from Enc(ek i0 , m 0 ), while in Hybrid k the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from Enc(ek i1 , m 1 ). Again, we look at four cases depending on whether ek
Notice, from the condition of the sender anonymity property, we have that the adversary can ask for the decryption key dk k , iff P (i 0 , k) = P (i 1 , k) for all k ∈ J. Thus, if the adversary queries dk k then we are in Case 1 or 4.
In Case 1, the two ciphertexts are indistinguishable, since they are chosen uniformly random from the same ciphertext space.
In Case 2 and 3, the adversary does not have the decryption key dk k . Thus, if the adversary can distinguish between the two hybrids, then he breaks the no-read rule of the 1-ACE scheme (see Case 2 and 3 for payload privacy).
In Case 4, we have P (i 0 , k) = P (i 1 , k) = 1, and the adversary is allowed to get the corresponding decryption key dk k . If the adversary queries dk k , then the condition states that m 0 = m 1 . Thus, the two 1-ACE ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message under the same 1-ACE encryption key. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish between the hybrids. If the adversary does not ask for the decryption key dk k , then we are in the same situation as in Case 4 for payload privacy.
Hybrid n ≈ Game 1. The same arguments as in the payload privacy case.
Theorem 4. Assume 1ACE is a 1-ACE scheme that satisfies the No-Write Rule, and let ACE be the ACE scheme from Construction 2 using 1ACE as the underlying 1-ACE scheme. Then ACE satisfies the No-Write Rule.
Proof. This theorem is shown by presenting a series of hybrid games such that no adversary can distinguish between two successive hybrids with non-negligible probability.
In the hybrid games we replace the encryption/sanitization algorithm with a special challenge ciphertext generation algorithm: Challenge k , which takes the encryption key ek i ′ , the sanitizer key rk, a random element r from the message space, and the ciphertext c generated by the adversary. The algorithm then encrypts and sanitizes message r to get ′ is generated by running Challenge 0 . From the description of this algorithm we can conclude that this is a ciphertext generated by ACE.San(rk, ACE.Enc(ek i ′ , r)). Thus, Game 0 and Hybrid 0 both generates the ciphertext c ′ as a sanitized ACE encryption of a random message. Thus, Game 0 and Hybrid 0 are identical and therefore indistinguishable to any adversary.
Game k − 1 ≈ Hybrid k. The difference between the two hybrids is the following: in Hybrid k − 1 the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from ACE.San(rk, ACE.Enc(ek i ′ , r)), while in Hybrid k the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is the k'th ciphertext from ACE.San(rk, c). This give rise to the following two cases depending on whether ek
Notice, from the condition stated by the no-write rule we have that for all i ∈ I S , j ∈ J it holds that P (i, j) = 0. This means that for all the encryption keys the adversary gets before the challenge and for all the decryption keys he gets during the game it must hold that the decryption keys cannot be used to decrypt anything encrypted using the encryption keys. Specially, this means that if the adversary gets dk k then ek 1ACE k / ∈ ek i ′ (i.e. Case 2). In Case 1, the adversary does not get the decryption key dk k . However, he has queried the encryption key ek i ′ , which contains ek 1ACE k
. If the adversary A is able to distinguish between Hybrid k − 1 and Hybrid k, then he is able to distinguish between the case where the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext is created as a sanitized encryption of message r or the sanitization of his ciphertext. This means that we can construct an adversary B that wins the alternative No-Write game (Def. 12, equivalent to Def. 3 by Lemma 6) for the 1-ACE scheme with non-negligible probability. (Note that here it is necessary to use the alternative No-Write game since the reduction must encrypt the same random value r in all positions.) Intuitively, this is done by letting B create the ciphertext c ′ as in Hybrid k, forward the challenge (c, i ′ , r), and replacing the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext by the one he receives from the challenger. Finally, he sends the new ciphertext to the adversary A.
If A wins the game with non-negligible probability, then so does the adversary B. This gives us a contradiction with the assumption that the 1-ACE scheme satisfies the no-write rule. Thus, we can conclude that A cannot distinguish between the two hybrids. Furthermore, notice that the adversary A can query encryption keys ek i , where ek 1ACE k ∈ ek i . In this case the adversary B queries his challenger for the encryption key ek 1ACE k . This never conflicts the no-write game for the 1-ACE scheme, since the adversary A never queries the decryption key dk k .
In Case 2, the adversary can freely query the decryption and encryption keys as long as he respect the conditions of the no-write game: 1) He can query dk k iff ek 1ACE k / ∈ ek i for all i ∈ I S , 2) He can query any encryption key after the challenge. If the adversary A can distinguish between the two hybrids, we can create an adversary B that wins the alternative no-write game (Def. 12) for the 1-ACE scheme. Intuitively, this is done by letting B create the ciphertext c ′ as in Hybrid k, forward the challenge together with message r, and replacing the k'th 1-ACE ciphertext by the one he receives from the challenger. Notice that if adversary A queries the decryption key dk k , then he cannot query any encryption key ek i for i ∈ I S , which contains ek . If A wins the game with non-negligible probability, then so does the adversary B. This gives us a contradiction with the assumption that the 1-ACE scheme satisfies the no-write rule. Thus, we can conclude that A cannot distinguish between the two hybrids.
If the adversary does not query the decryption key dk k , then he can either query an encryption key ek i , where ek 1ACE k ∈ ek i before the challenge (i.e. Case 1), or after the challenge (equivalent to Case 2). Furthermore, notice that in both cases all encryption queries (i, m) are answered by sending the message to the challenger to get the k'th 1-ACE sanitized ciphertext for the response.
Hybrid n ≈ Game 1. In Hybrid n the ciphertext c ′ is generated by running Challenge n . From the description of this algorithm we can conclude that this is actually a ciphertext generated by ACE.San(rk, c). Thus, Game 1 and Hybrid n both generates the ciphertext c ′ as a sanitized version of the ciphertext c. Thus, Game 1 and Hybrid n are identical and therefore indistinguishable to any adversary.
D Sanitizable Functional Encryption Scheme -Proofs

D.1 Proof of Lemma 3
In this appendix we show the full adaptive proof of the IND-CPA security for Construction 3. The proof follows closely the selective IND-CPA security proof of the functional encryption scheme presented by Garg et. al. [GGH + 13] . The main differences between the proof are the following: we enhance their proof by making it adaptive and quantifying the advantage of the adversary. Furthermore, we make a small change in the proof of the valid iO instance, which make the proof work for our sanitizable version of the functional encryption scheme. Hybrid 3,i for i = 0, . . . , q. The same as Hybrid 2, except that in the first j ≤ i secret key queries the secret key is generated as an obfuscation of program P 2 , while in the last j > i secret key queries the secret key is generated as an obfuscation of program P 1 . Observe, Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3,0 are identical.
Hybrid 6. The same as Hybrid 5, q, except that crs E and π * E is generated honestly, and the PKE ciphertexts are generated as in Hybrid 5, q, but after we see the challenge, and have checked that m 0 = m Claim 4. For any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 3, q and Hybrid 4, there exists an adversary C for the IND-CPA security game of the sanitizable PKE scheme such that the advantage of A is
The proof of the claim follow the same structure at the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 5. For any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 5, i and Hybrid 5, i + 1, there exists an adversary D for iO such that the advantage of A is adv A ≤ adv iO,C (1 − 2p sss ) where p sss is the negligible probability of the statistical simulation-soundness for the SSS-NIZK scheme.
The proof of the claim follow the same structure at the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 6. For any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 5, q and Hybrid 6, there exists an adversary B for the computational zero-knowledge property of the SSS-NIZK scheme such that the advantage of A is
The proof of the claim follow the same structure at the proof of Claim 1.
From these claims we can conclude that for any adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 6, there exists an adversary B for the computational zero-knowledge property of the SSS-NIZK scheme, an adversary C for the IND-CPA security game of the sanitizable PKE scheme, and an adversary D for iO such that the advantage of A is adv A ≤ 2 · adv NIZK,B + 2 · adv sPKE,C + 2q · adv iO,C (1 − 2p sss )
where q is the number of the secret key queries the adversary makes during the game. We conclude the proof of Lemma 3 by proving that for any adversary E that can distinguish Game 0 and Game 1, there exists an adversary A that can distinguish Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 6 such that the advantage of E is adv sFE,E ≤ 2|M| · adv
